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Thomas Kuhn (1922-96) was one of the leading figures of twentieth century history and 
philosophy of science.  His major book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of 
Chicago Press, 1962; 2nd ed., 1970; 3rd ed., 1996), is one of the most influential books in the 
field.  In the present volume, Alexander Bird presents a detailed, critical examination of 
Kuhn’s work that is broadly structured by the leading themes of Structure. 
Kuhn’s main aim in Structure was to propose a general model of the nature of scientific 
change.  According to Bird, this was not so much a philosophical project, as a project in 
‘theoretical history of science’ (p. 29).  For Kuhn sought to show that the development of 
science displays a certain general kind of pattern, and that attention to the details of this pattern 
enables the historian to explain episodes in the history of science.  This theoretical project, 
however, is not without philosophical substance. 
Indeed, the project of theoretical history led Kuhn both to oppose a widespread 
philosophical viewpoint, and to propose one of his own.  The viewpoint opposed by Kuhn is 
one which Bird describes as the Old Rationalism.  The Old Rationalists sought an account of 
the scientific method, which they took to be the basis of rational scientific theory acceptance 
and scientific progress (pp. 3-6).  By contrast, Kuhn’s own positive ideas fall within what Bird 
calls the New Paradigm (pp. 6-8).  Proponents of the New Paradigm tend to be sceptical of the 
existence of a universal, invariant method, and raise problems about scientific rationality and 
progress. 
A central feature of Kuhn’s model of scientific change is the idea that the development 
of science divides into periods of normal science based on a shared paradigm.  Normal science 
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is broken at intervals by revolutionary episodes in which the reigning paradigm is overthrown 
following a crisis induced by anomalies.  Bird argues that a sharp distinction cannot be 
sustained between normal and revolutionary science.  Instead, there is a continuum of cases 
between paradigm shift and normal science.  Anomaly may lead a paradigm to undergo 
non-revolutionary revision during a period of normal science (pp. 51-3).  There may even be 
revolutionary change in normal science without displacement of paradigm (pp. 58-9). 
Bird describes Kuhn’s model as a ‘cyclical’ one (pp. 21, 33).  But ‘cyclical’ may be 
too strong a word.  It suggests that the pattern of normal science followed by revolution and 
new normal science is destined to go on forever relentlessly repeating itself.  But nothing in 
Kuhn’s model entails that the process could not come to a halt with a completed normal 
science, unlikely as such an outcome may be.  Nor is there any reason why a science in a state 
of crisis could not pull back from the brink of revolution, returning to normal science under the 
old paradigm. 
As for the vexed term ‘paradigm’, Bird dissolves much of the obscurity that shrouded 
Kuhn’s original discussion.  Bird focuses on the distinction between exemplars and 
disciplinary matrices, which Kuhn introduced in the Postscript to the second edition of 
Structure in an attempt to explain what he really meant by ‘paradigm’ (p. 68).  The 
disciplinary matrix corresponds to the original idea of a paradigm as an overarching scientific 
world-view.  It comprises a set of symbolic generalizations, epistemic values, ontology, 
models and puzzle-solutions, accepted by a scientific community as the basis for research 
practice.  Exemplars are the last item on the list.  They are concrete puzzle-solutions, which 
serve a pedagogical function as laboratory exercises and problems in textbooks.  Bird employs 
the notion of an exemplar in his discussion of Kuhn’s views of perception and scientific 
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judgement, drawing parallels between the latter and connectionist views of cognition (pp. 
71-5). 
Kuhn was a well-known advocate of the theory-dependence of observation.  Bird 
introduces an important distinction between strong seeing, which requires that what is seen 
actually exist, and weak seeing, which does not (pp. 102-4).  Both may be understood in either 
an objectual sense (seeing X) or a propositional sense (seeing that p).  On the basis of this 
distinction, Bird argues against the extreme theory-dependence thesis that scientists’ 
perceptual experience varies with change of theory.  Bird grants that past experience 
influences present experience (p. 109), and that conceptualization of experience may be 
theory-laden (pp. 118-9), but insists that the influence of theory on experience is at best 
marginal (p. 122).  He argues that the extreme theory-dependence thesis runs claims about 
experience and concepts together (p. 119), and that Kuhn fails to show that observation cannot 
serve as neutral arbiter between theories (p. 122).  Bird’s rejection of extreme 
theory-dependence brings his approach into potential conflict (e.g., pp. 130-3) with defence of 
Kuhn based on a Kantian metaphysics, since it is at odds with the theory-dependence of 
scientists’ phenomenal world (cf. Paul Hoyningen-Huene, Reconstructing Scientific 
Revolutions: Thomas S. Kuhn’s Philosophy of Science,  University of Chicago Press, 1993). 
Kuhn was also an advocate of the thesis of semantic incommensurability.  Kuhn 
claimed that the meaning of scientific terms undergoes change in the course of a revolution.  
As a result, the vocabulary of rival theories may be mutually untranslatable, and their content 
may not be compared in point-by-point manner.  Bird notes that Kuhn’s critics tend to deny 
the importance of translation and to insist that theory comparison requires only common 
reference, which may survive change in intensional aspects of meaning (pp. 159-60).  But 
Kuhn held that reference is not immune to variation with theory change (p. 160).  Bird points 
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out that Kuhn’s views depend on the strong intensionalist assumptions that intension depends 
on an entire theoretical context and must be fully satisfied in order for a term to have a 
reference (p. 167).  Many philosophers critical of Kuhn have espoused causal accounts of 
reference which sever reference from intension (pp. 179-83).  Bird discusses problems with 
the causal theory of reference determination (pp. 184-5), which have led to the proposal of 
causal descriptive accounts of reference that Bird sees as a return to intensionalism (p. 185-7).  
He also provides useful discussion of the ‘taxonomic turn’ in Kuhn’s later work, in which 
translation failure between theories is due to changes in the classificatory systems which 
theories impose upon the world (pp. 191ff). 
Kuhn opposed realist accounts of science, and often sailed close to the epistemological 
relativist wind.  While Kuhn held that science progresses in an evolutionary sense, he was 
critical of the realist idea that progress consists in steady advance on the whole truth about the 
world.  Kuhn employs a historical induction against convergence on truth, which, Bird points 
out, rests on an exaggeration of the falsity of past theories (p. 226).  Kuhn also evinced doubts 
about correspondence between theory and reality, which fall foul of the disquotational 
T-scheme (pp. 228-9) and intriguingly parallel positivist reservations about correspondence 
truth (p. 234).  As for relativism, in Structure Kuhn suggested that criteria of theory evaluation 
are paradigm-dependent, and that there are no extra-paradigmatic standards which may serve 
as a neutral court of appeal.  Bird draws on recent reliabilist and naturalized epistemology to 
show that variation of scientific standards does not lead to epistemological relativism in the 
manner suggested by Kuhn’s original treatment in Structure (p. 251ff). 
In addition to detailed critical examination of philosophical aspects of Kuhn’s model of 
scientific change, Bird discusses the intellectual context in which Kuhn’s work originated, as 
well as the broader impact of his work.  Kuhn’s work arose against a backdrop of empiricism 
 
 5 
in the philosophy of science (pp. 9-13), and was influenced by Gestalt psychology (pp. 13-4) 
and Ludwik Flecks’ early work in the sociology of science (pp. 14-20). Structure contributed to 
a shift in the self-image of the social sciences by altering our conception of the natural sciences 
and of the scientific status of the social sciences (pp. 267-8).  While Kuhn sought to distance 
himself from contemporary sociology of science, he contributed to the demise of Whiggish 
history of science, as well as to the recognition of the social nature of scientific knowledge (pp. 
269-75).  On a more narrowly philosophical front, Kuhn was a transitional figure, many of 
whose central ideas have a Cartesian and empiricist lineage that has been rejected by more 
recent work in an externalist and naturalistic vein (e.g., pp. 146-7, 165, 245ff). 
Bird’s Thomas Kuhn is a well-written and incisive book which makes a major 
contribution to Kuhn studies.  It  is informed and informative both about Kuhn’s own work 
and the critical literature on Kuhn.  For those not familiar with Kuhn’s views, the book will 
serve as a balanced and accessible introduction.  For those already engaged with the literature 
on Kuhn, the book is an important contribution, which advances discussion of several of the 
leading themes in the literature.  I highly recommend the book for the specialist and novice 
alike, as a readable, informative and critical overview of Kuhn. 
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